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Tunisia’s relations with Israel in a
comparative approach
The case of the debate on normalisation during the Arab Awakening
Samuel Ghiles-Meilhac
1 A lot of attention has been given to Egypt’s relationship with Israel after Mubarak’s fall
and the crisis affecting the first Arab state to have signed a peace treaty with Israel, and
very little to the Tunisian case. Tunisia, though it is not directly involved with Middle
Eastern security issues related to Israel, does offer a fascinating case study regarding the
Arab world approach towards Israel in the aftermath of the Arab Awakening.
2 This paper intends to assess the impacts of this regional turmoil on the Tunisian debate
on normalization with Israel.  To this  end,  it  adopts  a  comparative approach by first
exposing relevant precedents and analysing the factors that enabled a normalization of
relations with Israel, whether to mark a political independence with the USSR in the case
of some of its former satellites, or due to the influence of the EU in an integration process
as in the case of Spain, or as for Egypt and Jordan, in the context of a peace treaty. This
paper questions the influence of the democratization factor in the Tunisian debate in the
context of the Arab Awakening and whether or not it enables a normalization of relations
with Israel. It also take into account the role of the EU in this process in the framework of
the EU-Tunisian partnership.
3 As argued by the different contributors of this volume, Israel has not been at the heart of
the political and social dynamics leading masses of people to take the streets in Tunisia,
Yemen, Syria, Libya and Egypt.
4 Yet,  Israel’s  diplomatic  history,  marked  by  long  periods  of  isolation,  offers  a  wide
diversity  of  cases  to  study  the  factors  leading  to a  process  of  establishment  or
reestablishment of full  relations and the Arab Awakening provides a very interesting
context in which reassessing them.
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Relevant precedents of normalization of relations with
Israel
Relations of Post-Soviet countries with Israel : the political break
factor
5 The Soviet Union and its satellite states had severed all ties with Israel after 1967 Six Day
War. The USSR strongly supported Egypt and Syria in their military confrontation with
the  Jewish state.  Romania  remained the  only  exception within the  socialist  block in
maintaining diplomatic relations with Israel. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end
of the Cold War brought a complete change. During the processes of democratization of
eastern and central Europe at the late 1980’s -early 1990’s, all these states re-established
full diplomatic relations with Israel.  The Federation of Russia and all the eastern and
central European states took the same path and normalized their relations with Israel.
Looking at the chronology of these evolutions, we see that the recognition of Israel and
the  establishment  of  a  variety  of  partnerships  with  were  not  the  results  of  outside
pressures.
6 These moves took place many years before the enlargement of NATO and then the EU. For
example, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary had restored diplomatic relations with
Israel since 1989-1990 and became members of NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004.
7 They  followed  a  regional  dynamic  that  was  not  limited  to  newly  independent  post-
communist countries eager to join political and military alliances, as the study of the
relations between Israel and the Federation of Russia shows. 
8 In turn, the opening of full diplomatic ties with Israel was influenced by two different
dynamics. For Central and Oriental European countries willing to integrate the European
sphere,  the normalization of  their  relations was  due to the willingness  of  their  new
leaders. The latters wanted at the same time to mark a break with the anti-Israeli past of
the Soviet period and to show a pro-western diplomatic orientation. The common past
with Jewish communities decimated by the Nazis and their collaborators also played a
role in these political development. Accordingly, in this case, neither the EU nor NATO
triggered  the  establishment  of  relations  with  Israel.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  these  new
Member States seeked to influence the European foreign policy in a more pro-Israeli way1
.
9 Regarding the Russian Federation, the evolution of its relation with Israel had already
started with the end of the Gorbachev era, the last President of the Soviet Union. The
establishment of diplomatic ties with Israel, under Boris Yeltsin, responded to a political
desire  to  universalize  the  diplomatic  relations  of  Russia2.  The  development  of  a
partnership with Israel,  notably  at  the economic  level,  continued under  the term of
Vladimir Putin since summer 1999. Thus, the degree of pluralism of Russian institutions
as  well  as  its  relations  with  NATO and the  EU do  not  account  for  the  definition  of
Moscow’s bilateral relation with Israel at least in a decisive way.
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The Spanish scenario: the influence of the integration in the EU
10 At the time of its creation, in 1948, Israel did not intend to establish official ties with
Spain. Governed by Franco, whose victory over the Republicans in the 1936-39 civil war
had to do with military support and direct implication of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy,
Spain was seen by the left-wing leaders of the new-born State of Israel as an international
actor to exclude. Israeli leaders repeatedly publicly condemned the regime of Madrid. On
May 16 1949, Israel, which had become an elected member of the United Nations just 5
days before, voted against a proposed resolution on the lifting of the diplomatic sanctions
imposed on Spain since 19463. On the Spanish side, two dynamics were colluding in the
shaping of diplomacy towards Israel. Franco seemed to have hoped for a moral support
from the Jewish state because of some aspects of his policy towards Jews escaping Europe
under Nazi rule during the Second World War. Indeed, Spain did help a certain number of
Jews,  between  a  few  hundreds  and  a  few  thousands.  From  May  to  autumn  1940,  a
“generous” visa policy allowed them to cross the Spanish territory if  they had valid
documents to the United States from Portugal4. Madrid’s diplomats also helped and saved
an uncertain number of Jews of Sephardic origins in different parts of Europe and the
Balkans5. But for Spain, the most important dimension in the way it viewed the Middle-
East was the privileged relationships established with the Arab world at war with Israel6.
These relations were essential in the first years after 1945 when the country was isolated
on the international scene7.  After the death of the Caudillo on 20 November 1975, the
question  of  the  recognition  of  Israel  emerged  in  the  public  debate  in  Madrid.
Normalization and universalization were two proclaimed goals of the new diplomacy in
this period, but the stance towards Israel did not change substantially during the first
years of the democratic transition, even after the Egyptian-Israeli breakthrough following
Sadate’s  visit  in Jerusalem in November 1977.  Israeli  leaders also called on European
states to convince Spain to change its position8.
11 It is only when Madrid was in the last stage of its adhesion process to the European
Community  that  several  countries,  such  as  France,  the  Netherlands  and  the  Federal
Republic of Germany, insisted on the need for Spain to establish full diplomatic ties with
the Jewish State. Nevertheless, the fear of commercial retaliation and a possible embargo
from the Arab world pushed Spanish leaders to delay the normalization of their ties with
Israel. The Arab League tried to prevent the move until the last minute. Despite the threat
of the Arab boycott, on the 17th of January 1986, a decade after the fall of Franco, the two
countries  established  full  diplomatic  relations,  during  a  public  meeting  between the
Israeli  and Spanish Prime ministers,  Shimon Peres and Felipe Gonzalez9.  Eleven years
after  Franco’s  death,  Spain  and  Israel  finally  normalized  their  relationship  and
ambassadors  were  exchanged  between  Spain  and  Israel10.  This  political  event  had
historical meanings. Shimon Peres presented the establishment of diplomatic relations as
the end of five centuries of a forced separation rooted in the 1492 expulsion of the Jews
from the Iberian Peninsula ordered by the Catholic monarchs of Spain11.
12 This paper questions whether a similar scenario could apply to post-2011 Tunisia.  Of
course it does not intend to draw a full analogy with the Spanish scenario as Tunisia is not
a candidate country to the EU. Yet, Tunisia has presented itself since its independence as
a bridge between the Arab world and Europe. Moreover, it is the first Mediterranean
country to sign an Association Agreement with the EU in 1995. Thus, it does provide an
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interesting  case  study  when  it  comes  to  the  debates  and  factors  dealing  with  the
normalisation of the relations between the Arab world and the State of Israel.
 
The Egyptian/Jordan scenario: the necessity of peace treaties
13 Before examining the case of Tunisia, it is necessary to recall briefly the process leading
two Israel’s Arab neighbours, Egypt and Jordan, to conclude peace treaties with it. 
14 As  Tunisia,  they  are  Arab  states,  members  of  the  Arab  league.  The  history  of  their
relations with Israel is one of several deadly wars then the signature of peace treaties.
15 Egypt, the most populated Arab state, fought four wars against Israel in a quarter of a
century:  1948,  1956,  1967 and 1973.  Then,  in November 1977,  in a speech before the
People’s Assembly, Egyptian President Anwar-al Sadat announced that he was ready to go
anywhere, including the Israeli Knesset, to achieve peace in the region. His journey to
Jerusalem marked the history of the Middle-East. In what context did this normalization
between two arch-enemies take place?
16 The recognition of Israel and the peace process that followed and led to the 1978 Camp
David accords was part of a profound reorientation of Egypt’s foreign policy. Cairo shifted
alliances in putting an the end of the alliance with the Soviet Union ( abrogation in March
1976 of the 1971 Egyptian-Soviet Friendship) and gradually established a military and
financial  partnership with the United States,  receiving since the en of  the 1970’s  an
annual American assistance of around 2 million dollars12. The “Egypt first” policy, where
Cairo signed a peace treaty with Israel in order to recover its full sovereignty over the
Sinai peninsula outside of a concerted Arab policy, led to its regional isolation, illustrated
by its exclusion of the Arab league. This massive re-orientation of Egypt’s foreign policy
was not the result of a national debate nor a ratification by parliamentary bodies elected
in  transparent  and  fair  elections.  While  Kirk  Beatie’s  assessment  that  “by  Egyptian
political standards, the measure of support for Sadat’s peace treaty was truly impressive”,
the decision-making process was undoubtedly a top to bottom one13.
17 The  first  peace  treaty  signed  between  Israel  and  an  Arab  state  survived  Sadat’s
assassination (1981),  the invasion of  Lebanon (1982)  and the two Palestinian intifadas
(1987 and 2000).  But the relationship between the two countries is a cold peace with
strong oppositions from cultural and intellectual circles to normalization.
18 Jordanian-Israeli relations took a different path but the decision making was similar to
the  Egyptian one and the  civil  society  largely  remained excluded from the  strategic
orientation  towards  Israel.  Discrete  mutual  understandings  took  place  between  the
Hashemite kingdom and Israel  from 1948 onwards14.  But it  is  only in 1994,  after the
declaration of principles between Israel and the PLO, that Amman signed a peace treaty
with its western neighbor. The will expressed by King Hussein to achieve a warm peace
where cooperation and trust would prevail, thus distancing his policy from the Israeli-
Egyptian, did not last. As Robert Satloff emphasised in an article published a few weeks
after the signature of the treaty: “The overriding psychological element in the Egypt-
Israel treaty is respect--the two sides will “respect the territorial integrity of the other;”
“respect each other’s sovereignty”; and “respect each other’s right to live in peace.” In
substance, the content of the treaty is suffused with concerns about security, including
detailed annexes outlining the creation of an international force to monitor the intrusive
and lopsided security regime mandated for the Sinai.  In the Jordan-Israel  treaty,  the
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concept  of  “partnership” replaces  the  emphasis  on  “respect,” while  “cooperation”
replaces the focus on “security.”15
19 But in reality the relations have been limited to security and some economic cooperation
and a cold peace prevail while anti-normalization mobilizations are still very present,
especially since the outbreak of the second Intifada in autumn 200016.
20 Egypt and Jordan share the same top-down decision making process. The strategic choice
to recognize Israel came from the top of the regime and very little space was left in the
public sphere for debating and choosing the degree of the relation with Israel. In other
words, opposition to the peace treaty with Israel meant an opposition to the regime.
 
Ongoing reflexion on the Tunisian debate: Could
democracy be a factor enabling future normalization?
The Tunisian case compared to the Spanish scenario
21 Three decades after the democratic transition in Southern Europe and its implications in
the relations between Europe and Israel, Tunisia offers a fascinating comparative case.
22 More than 2,000 kilometers separate Tunisia from Israel. Independent from France since
1956, it is not a strategic player in Middle-East politics. As the quote attributed to Henry
Kissinger goes, “You can’t make war in the Middle East without Egypt and you can’t make
peace without Syria”. But that does not automatically disconnect the Maghreb from the
Palestinian question. Tunisia did not have the same attitude as Libya and Algeria, which
saw themselves as champions of Arab nationalism, as both condemned the Camp David
accords and gave political and material support to Palestinian armed groups. By contrast,
Tunisia  developed  an  original  diplomatic  approach  towards  the  Israeli-Palestinian
conflict.
23 As a matter of fact, in April 1965, Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba’s declarations on
the topic created a political storm in the Arab Middle-East.  In a speech he gave at a
refugee  camp  near  Jericho,  under  Jordanian  sovereignty  at  the  time,  the  father  of
Tunisia’s independence openly criticized the strategies adopted by the Palestinians and
the rest of the Arab world in their conflict with the Zionist movement and, since 1948, the
State of Israel. He condemned the approach that characterized according to him the Arab
leadership on the Palestinian matter: “As for the policy of the “whole or nothing”, it
brought us to the defeat in Palestine and reduced us to the sad situation we are struggling
with today.” Recalling his  own attitude during the Tunisian quest  for  independence,
when he accepted autonomy as a first step towards sovereignty, he lamented the fact“
that in Palestine, on the contrary, the Arabs pushed away the compromise solutions. They
refused the division [the 1947 partition plan] and the clauses of the White Paper. Then
they regretted it.” He stressed the need to accept the UN resolutions, first of all the 181
one—the partition plan voted in November 1947 by the General Assembly – a de facto
recognition of the international legitimacy to a Jewish sovereignty on Palestine17.  His
position of sober realism towards the physical existence of Israel triggered a diplomatic
storm between Tunisia and the other members of the Arab league18. Following this, Israel
developed an indirect policy in favor of Tunisia by trying to use Diaspora Jews for the
purpose of reaching Bourguiba. For this purpose, in 1965-1966, Golda Meir’s asked the
Israeli  ambassador in Washington to encourage American Jews to visit  Tunisia « as a
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token of goodwill » towards an Arab state that was challenging Nasser leadership on the
Israeli-Arab dispute. The articulation between tourism and the interactions with Diaspora
Jews constitute since then two very important factors in the evolution of Israeli-Tunisian
ties19.
24 Tunisia’s special connections to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must also be understood
through its Jewish heritage.  In the early 1950’s,  the Jewish population was estimated
around 95,00020. Thousands of them emigrated in the following years to France and Israel.
In June 1967, following the victory of the Israeli army in the Six-day war, revolts targeting
the Jewish communities in took place in Tunis where 25 000 Jews lived at that time. The
government’s efforts to crackdown on the attackers didn’t stop the acceleration of the
emigration process. As a result, only 10 000 Jews have since remained in the country. The
Tunisian authorities have always attached great importance on presenting the Jewish
community as an integral part of the national identity. Public discourses traditionally
underlined the necessity to dissociate the Tunisian Jews from the issue of Tunisia’s stance
on the Israeli-Arab conflict.
25 The importation of the conflict in Tunisia received fresh impetus after Yasser Arafat and
more than 4,000 fighters and militants of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
found refuge in Tunisia after being expelled from Lebanon at the end of the summer 1982
during the Israeli invasion and blockade of Beirut. In its third exile in an Arab state, after
Jordan and Lebanon, the Palestinian leadership crossed the Mediterranean Sea, under
French escort,  and settled in the Tunisian capital.  The decision came with a cost for
Bourguiba’s country when in October the 1st 1985, eight Israeli jets bombed several PLO
buildings in the Hammam al-Shatt neighbourhood, located in the south of the capital,
killing dozens of Palestinians and Tunisians. Arafat escaped from the bombing but Israel
hit again the Tunisian territory three years later, in April 1988, when a Mossad squad
assassinated Abou Jihad21.
26 Following  the  signature  of  the  1993  declaration  of  principles  between  the  Israeli
government  and  the  PLO,  Israel  and  Tunisia  took  several  steps  enabling  mutual
recognition22. President Ben Ali, who succeeded Bourguiba in 1987, did not venture as far
as Morocco during the Oslo peace process. The level of public dialogue fell short from
what took place between King Hassan II  and Israel.  The Israeli  delegation, headed by
Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin, made a stop on September 14 1993 on the way back to Israel
from the signing ceremony in Washington and Moroccan and Israeli leaders, like Foreign
Minister Shimon Peres, met on several occasions. In Tunisia the contacts focused mostly
on promoting Israeli  tourism in Tunisia  and facilitate  the arrangement for  visas  .An
Israeli Interest office opened in Tunis in 1996 and a Tunisian bureau was established in
Tel-Aviv. Israeli citizens, especially those coming for the Ghriba pilgrimage in the Djerba
peninsula could enter the Tunisian territory with their passports23. Public contacts were
severed after the outbreak of the Second Intifada in autumn 2000 but Israeli nationals
continued to be authorized to visit Tunisia and so were travellers holding a passport with
an Israeli stamp.
27 Now, Tunisia has been the starting point of the Arab spring. It is there than for the first
time the massive mobilization of the population of an Arab state lead to the fall  and
departure of an authoritarian leader. Diplomats, journalists and researchers have focused
on the major internal dynamics within the Tunisian society since 2011: emergence of
political parties, challenges of building new institutions, the role of religion in the public
sphere, etc. But, as emphasized in this paper, the Tunisian public opinion also addressed
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international questions. The most urgent issues concerned immediate challenges at the
border of Tunisia, such as a humanitarian and security crisis during and following the
Libyan civil war, the NATO military intervention and the fall of Khadaffi’s regime. The
relationship  with  France,  the  former  colonial  ruler,  was  also  a  sensitive  issue,  as
illustrated by the demonstrations leading to the early departure of Boris Bouillon, the
French ambassador in Tunis from February 2011 to August 2012. To what extend has the
Palestinian question become an issue in the post-Ben Ali Tunisia?
28 Before tackling this question, it is worth noting that some European leaders established a
parallel  between  the  new political  era  in  the  Arab  world  and  the  resolution  of  the
Palestinian question. Nicolas Sarkozy, France’s President from 2007 to 2012, stressed the
absence of hostile slogans against Israel as a positive factor in his judgement of the Arab
springs. Inspired by French intellectual André Glucksmann, he highlighted the absence of
any Israel-related slogans in the demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt24. In a conference
given in Paris at the end of the summer 2011, in front of all the French ambassadors he
declared: “What were these young people saying, almost in unison? They weren’t saying ”
Down with the West“ or ”Down with America,“ or even ”Down with Israel." They were
demanding  freedom  and  democracy,  respect  and  dignity.  They  showed  that  in  our
interconnected world, people have the same expectations on the northern and southern
shores of the Mediterranean”25 He repeated this argument a few days later at the UN
General assembly: “I want to tell the Israeli people, with deep and sincere friendship:
Listen to what the young people of the Arab Spring are screaming. They are screaming,
“Long live to freedom!” They are not crying, “Down with Israel.” You cannot remain
motionless when this wind of freedom and democracy is blowing through your region.”
He  again  put  forward  this  argument  in  February  2012  at  the  annual  dinner  of  the
Representative Council of French Jewish Institutions.
29 The French president also stressed the absence of the Israeli question in the rhetoric of
the demonstrators as a proof explaining that these events were not the Arab version of
the Iranian Islamic revolution. What’s more, David Cameron, Prime minister of the United
Kingdom, at the UN general assembly in September 2011, described the Arab Spring as “a
massive opportunity to spread peace » and a « challenge to the Israelis and Palestinians,
to take the bold steps to come to the table and make lasting peace. » He added that “a key
part of the Arab Spring is the right of Palestinians to have a viable state of their own,
living in peace, alongside a safe and secure state of Israel. »26
30 In  the  Tunisian  case,  the  absence  of  hostile  slogans  against  Israel  during  the
demonstrations and its different political outcomes compared to the Islamic revolution of
Iran, did not mean the absence of support to Palestinians.
 
Palestine as a lasting mobilizing cause in Tunisia
31 The National Constituent Assembly was elected on October 23, 2011, with a majority of
Ennahda,  the  Islamic  party,  members.  Its  main  role  was  to  draft  and  adopt  a  new
constitution. 
32 The draft of the Tunisian constitution published in the spring 2012 was the first text of
this  kind  emerging  from  a  post-Arab  Spring  country.  Interestingly  enough,  it  did
specifically  mention  the  Palestinian  issue,  thus  illustrating  the  fact  that  the  Israeli-
Palestinian conflict  clearly  remains  very  high in  the  public  agenda of  such a  young
democracy.  Its  preamble  stated  that  Tunisia  stands  “with  the  peoples  of  the  world;
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achieving victory  for  the  oppressed  everywhere,  for  the  people’s  right  to  self-
determination,  and  for  rightful  liberation  movements  including  the  Palestinian
Liberation Movement; and fighting all forms of discrimination and anti-human racism
including Zionism;”27
33 Zionism was labelled as racism, following the heritage of the 1975 United Nations General
Assembly related resolution,  which was revoked in 1991.  To the best  of  the author’s
knowledge, this was the only direct reference to an external conflict explicitly mentioned
in the draft constitution. It did not trigger specific reactions from the European Union or
Member States’  leaders.  Yet,  criticisms were voiced by the organization Human Right
Watch. In a document pointing out what it considered as “serious flaws” in the text, the
international  non-governmental  organization  stated  that  “  the  draft  constitution
contains another article criminalizing any form of ‘normalization’ with ‘Zionism and the
Zionist state’ which could lead to repressing various forms of peaceful expression and
exchange with Israeli citizens.”28
34 The Constituent Assembly released a new draft on December 14, 2012, maintaining these
articles. The concern was openly reiterated by HRW on January 22 2013, in a letter to the
Tunisian National Constituent Assembly29. The article concerning Israel were presented
as potential threat to freedom of expression, Nevertheless,  these articles still  did not
draw public criticisms from European leaders despite the actual coverage of this issue in
the European and Israeli presses. Nothing compared to the European pressures on Spain
can be found when it comes to Tunisia.
35 It is worth considering that the context surrounding this constitutional debate was tense.
In January 2012, Ismayl Haniyeh, Hamas Prime Minister of Gaza, made a diplomatic tour
in the Middle-East and North-Africa. In January 2012, he spent several days in Tunisia. He
was greeted at  Tunis  Carthage international  airport  by a  crowd of  hundreds of  who
screamed “death to the Jews!”, an event widely reported in the international press 30
36 Another  example  on  how  heavily  the  Palestinian  question  resonates  in  Tunisia  was
indirectly highlighted by Choukri Belaïd’s death. Shot in the streets of Tunis in February
2013, the lawyer was a fierce secular opponent of the party Enahada but also the head of
the “anti-normalization” committee, a group devoted to the prevention of any contact
between Tunisia and Israel. Belaïd’s position shows the alliance between the Islamists and
the Arab nationalist stream, fiercely opposed on all issues but on Israel.
37 The anti-Israel bill was eventually abandoned in the definitive version of the Constitution
adopted  in  January  2014,  but  the  preamble  maintained  a  specific  reference  to  the
Palestinian  question,  stating  that  the  Tunisian  Republic  supports  “just  liberation
movements at the forefront of which is the Palestinian liberation movement”. Sophie
Bessis,  a  Franco-Tunisian  historian  and  journalist,  emphasized  the  importance  of
Bourguiba’s legacy in the way different actors position themselves today on the conflict31.
According to her, the outcome of the constitutional controversy can be seen as a victory
of a pragmatic approach in the footsteps of Bourguiba’s diplomacy: no peace treaty with
Israel  before  the  creation  of  a  Palestinian  state  but  the  rejection  of  the  maximalist
approach  combined  with  the  need  to  defend  Tunisia’s  essential  economic  interests,
tourism, which means to continue to accept Israeli tourists.
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Conclusion
38 The Tunisian situation towards Israel is unique. This Arab and Muslim country located far
geographically  from  the  Israeli-Palestinian  conflict,  is  conserving  a  small  Jewish
community while showing a strong sense of solidarity towards the Palestinian cause. It is
the  only  country  of  the  ‘Arab  revolutions’  that  has  been  continuing  successfully  to
implement a  democratic  and pluralist  political  agenda.  As  such,  this  case permits  to
rethink the study of the relations of the Arab world with Israel as well as the foreign
policy  of  the  EU.  At  the  time of  writing (Spring 2014),  the  debate  on the  degree  of
normalisation with Israel is going on in Tunisia. It focuses on the authorization or not for
Israelis to visit the country. A majority seems to favour a formula which authorizes the
entrance of Israeli tourists, for the sake of economic interests, yet without seeking to
establish any relation at the official level with Israel. 
39 If this were the case, for the first time, an Arab society would have decided the nature of
its relation with Israel following an internal debate. As seen bellow, any attempt aiming
at preventing future changes in the relation with Israel have been suppressed from the
Constitution. The repetition of the Spanish scenario, in which total normalization results
from a European collective pressure, does not seem realistic in this context. 
40 Regarding the EU’s relative silence on this issue, two hypothesis can be put forward as
avenues for future research. The first would be that Europe is aware of its limited power
outside of its frontiers and does not believe that it could force Tunisia to adopt a policy of
diplomatic normalization with Israel while the Palestinian question remains unsolved.
The second one concerns the evolution of the EU-Israel partnership in the light of the
crisis of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Brussels has shown a growing dissatisfaction
towards  Israel’s  settlement  policy  in the West  Bank by issuing in summer 2013 new
guidelines concerning Israeli entities and their activities in the occupied territories.
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ABSTRACTS
The deep political  transformations that have taken place in Tunisia since the overthrown of
president Ben Ali in January 2011 have shaped a new framework when it comes to the diplomatic
relations between Israel and Arab states. For the first time, a pluralistic Arab society, openly
debates,  through  democratic  institutions,  on  its  diplomatic  strategies  regarding  Israel.  This
article analyzes the interactions between Tunisia’s internal transformations and the debate on
the level of normalization with Israel. Post-1975 Spain is taken as an example where democratic
transition, combined with European pressure, lead to normalization with Israel. The Tunisia case
offers a complex on-going situation where the European Union seems to play a limited role. 
Les  profondes  transformations  politiques  intervenues  en  Tunisie  depuis  le  renversement  du
président  Ben Ali  en  janvier 2011  créent  une  nouvelle  configuration  dans  les  relations
diplomatiques  entre  Israël  et  les  pays  arabes.  Pour  la  première  fois,  c’est  une  société  arabe
pluraliste, dotée d’institutions démocratiques, qui débat publiquement de ses stratégies à l’égard
d’Israël.  Cet  article  analyse  les  interactions  entre  les  changements  politiques  internes  de  la
Tunisie,  mis en miroir avec le cas de l’Espagne post-franquiste,  et les débats concernant une
éventuelle normalisation avec Israël. Le cas tunisien offre une situation complexe et mouvante,
face à laquelle l’Union européenne semble être en retrait.
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Mots-clés: Israël, Tunisie, Union Européenne, Relations diplomatiques, Transitions
démocratiques
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